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The Macroeconomic Consequences
of China's Partially-Reformed
Economy
The key to eradicating the deflation bias lies in establishing an efficient
financial intermediation mechanism
Wing Thye Woo
Reading the Macroeconomic Tea Leaves
1 The annualised growth rate for China in the first half of 2003 was 8.2% compared with
8.0% in 2002, and inflation was -0.4% for the first half of 2003 compared with -1.3% in
20021.  Since  the  growth  and  inflation  rates  in  the  first  half  of  2002  were  still
substantially  below  their  respective  averages  of  9.4%  and  5.5%  during  the  period
1979-2002,  it  appears  that  China's  economy  is  still  operating  below  production
capacity2. However, there are other indications that overheating might just be round
the corner. Data just released on the third quarter of 2003 show that GDP growth had
climbed to 9.1%, and that growth in fixed asset investment spending had remained
above 30%,  a  continuation of  the higher investment growth that  began in the first
quarter of 2003. Jonathan Anderson, an economist with the Union Bank of Switzerland,
assessed recent growth as understated,  saying that “[the] ‘true’  GDP growth should
exceed 11% in 2003”. The perhaps most puzzling part is that the inflation rate has,
however, remained at zero3.
2 The fact that the macroeconomy’s vital signs are ambiguous and are causing confusion
among top leaders is very well captured in two newspaper headlines that appeared on
two consecutive days in August 2003. On August 18th 2003, an article in the Straits Times
of Singapore under the headline “Hu calls for more work creation as jobless rate rises”
reported that the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jintao, had
called  for  “stronger  measures…  [like]  fiscal  subsidies,  tax  incentives,  insurance
subsidies and credit  opportunities” to spur economic growth.  On August 19th 2003,
Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post carried an article headlined “Investments soar
amid reluctance to rein in growth” which reported that  the Chairman of  the State
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Development and Reform Commission, Ma Kai, had “urged the nation to be wary of
overheating and unveiled measures to cut back lending at state-run banks”. 
3 The cost of erring on the overly conservative side is certainly a high one. The official
growth target of 7% in 2003 could create only 10 million new urban jobs, and there are
24 million urban job-seekers4. On top of this, 150 million of China’s 500 million rural
workforce are “effectively” unemployed—and this is the most conservative estimate!5
The cost of an overheating could also be major because high inflation in the past has
been seen at times to undermine social stability. Furthermore, overheating is a sign
that the state credit system has been undermining economic restructuring objectives
by bailing out inefficient state enterprises,  and funding investments in sectors with
excess capacity.
4 As  if  China’s  macroeconomic  managers  are  not  already  sufficiently  vexed  by  the
confusing  signals  of  “overheating”  and  “below-potential  growth”,  they  now  face
tremendous political pressures from Japan, Western Europe and the United States to
revalue the renminbi substantially6. The current round of external indignation over an
undervalued renminbi was set off on December 1st 2002 when two senior officials of
Japan’s  Ministry  of  Finance  wrote  in  the  Financial  Times that  “China  is  exporting
deflation…  through  export  growth  and  a  combination  of  price  deflation  and  an
exchange rate pegged to the dollar”, and they asked China “to allow the currency to
appreciate”7.  By mid-2003, South Korea, Western Europe and the United States have
joined Japan in urging an appreciation of the renminbi to reduce unfair competition
from  cheap  Chinese  imports8.  How  China  will  respond  to  this  foreign  clamour  for
revaluation  of  the  renminbi  will,  not  surprisingly,  depend  on  its  diagnosis  of  the
current macroeconomic situation. If Chinese leaders conclude that deflation is a more
probable threat to China's  economic growth than overheating,  then there would at
most be the introduction of  a  minor trading band around the current renminbi-US
dollar exchange rate.
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Table 1 : Output growth and inflation performance in China (1979-2003)
 
Sources : China Statistical Yearbook, 2001 and 2002 editions.
5 In  assessing  what  the  appropriate  stance  of  macroeconomic  exchange  rate  policies
should be, the foremost relevant analytical issue is whether China is already at the
“natural”  growth  rate,  i.e.  the  maximum  sustainable  output  growth  rate  that  is
compatible with price stability. The operational difficulty is that the natural growth
rate  of  an  economy  is  not  immutable  over  time,  e.g.  a  change  in  the  rate  of
technological innovation would change the natural growth rate. In our view, there are
two components to understanding China’s recent macroeconomic performance.
6 The first  component is  that the growth of aggregate supply has slowed down since
1997. This view is based on the observation that every growth rate in the 1997-2002
sub-period is below 9.4%, the average annual growth rate in 1997-2002. This extended
period of  below-average  growth is  unprecedented in  China’s  market  reform,  which
suggests that the slower growth phase near the end of the 1990s is the result of China
having largely exhausted the growth potential created by the economic deregulation
and  internationalisation.  Our  interpretation  of  a  growth  slowdown  upon  economic
maturation is based on our more general view that the impressive post-1978 growth of
China  was  generated  by  the  steady  convergence  of  a  formerly  autarkic  developing
country to the frontier of modern science9. The closer to the world science frontier, the
lower the catch-up rate of growth—which is consistent with the slowing down of the
average growth rate in the 1979-96 sub-period from 9.9% to 7.8% in the 1997-2003 sub-
period.
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Table 2 : Investment trends by ownership (as % of GDP)
NB: Investment refers to ﬁxed asset investment.
1984 was the year that the central government gave the clear signal that it had no ideological
objection to the formation of rural enterprises.
Rural = rural collectives and rural individuals. 
State-owned entreprises do not include state-controlled units listed under varions typs of joint-owned
units (e.g. share-holding units, joint ventures units).
Sources : China Statistical Yearbook, compiled from varions annual editions 
7 The second component of our explanation of recent macroeconomic performance is
that there was also a large downward shift in the inflation rate between the two sub-
periods,  an annual  average of  7.8% in 1979-1996 versus -1.4% in 1997-2002.  Clearly,
there must also have been a slowdown in the growth of aggregate demand because in
the  absence  of  a  drop  in  aggregate  demand  growth,  a  fall  in  supply  growth  (as
identified  above)  would  have  produced  an  outcome  of  lower  growth-cum-higher
inflation  (i.e.  stagflation)  rather  than  the  observed  outcome  of  lower  growth-cum-
deflation.  More  precisely,  the  lower  growth-cum-deflation  phenomenon  in  the
1997-2002  sub-period  means  that  the  slowdown  in  aggregate  demand  growth  was
greater than the slowdown in supply-side growth. In the next section, we will develop
the argument that China's dysfunctional banking system has created a deflationary bias
in the economy.
8 The  Retail  Price  Index  (RPI)  showed  a  price  deflation  in  October  1997,  as  did  the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in February 1998. When it became apparent by the middle
of 1998 that the economy was slowing down significantly, the government began to
implement monetary and fiscal measures to boost aggregate demand. The interest rate
has been reduced eight times in less then six years, with the latest rate cut on February
21st 2001, which brought the one-year deposit rate to 1.98% and the one-year lending
rate  to  2.34%.  After  the  jump  in  government  spending  the  fiscal  deficit  increased
substantially from 1.1% of GDP in 1998 to 1.9% in 1999, 2.5% in 2000, 2.7% in 2001 and
2.9% in 200210.  Most government economists,  e.g.  Jia 11,  believe that the investment
using funds raised through treasury bond issuance contributed about two percentage
points to GDP growth each year in the 1999-2002 period.
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9 With the encouragement of the central bank, especially with the onset of SARS in early
2003, the state banks greatly expanded their loans, especially to the real estate sector,
and money growth went from 16.8% in the fourth quarter of 2002 to reach 20.0% in the
second quarter of 2003. The combination of additional fiscal and monetary stimulus to
offset the deleterious effects of SARS on aggregate demand caused the rate of fixed
asset investment to jump from 21.6% in the fourth quarter of 2002 to over 30% in the
first  three  quarters  of  2003.12 The  unfortunate  feature  about  encouraging  SOE
investments, as emphasised by Fan and Woo13, is that, in a partially-reformed centrally-
planned economy, there are many institutional features that motivate SOE investments
to veer out of control frequently, and overheat the economy as a by-product—which
might be beginning to happen in the second half of 2003.
The Deflationary and Current Account Consequences of Inadequate Financial
Intermediation
10 At a superficial level, the systemic deflationary pressures that have plagued China since
1997 have their  sources in,  one,  a  shrinking money multiplier  (a  phenomenon that
many Chinese economists have called “the liquidity trap”), and two, a slowing down in
the  growth  of  consumption  (a  phenomenon  commonly  known  as  “the  paradox  of
thrift”).14 China has tried to boost the domestic economy with successive cuts in
interest  rates,  but  the rise  in  credit  creation  has  been much lower  than expected,
except for the periods when the central bank leaned heavily upon the banks.15 The
paradox  of  thrift  refers  to  the  low  level  of  private  aggregate  demand because  the
private saving rate has been increasing. The saving rate went from almost 20% of GDP
in 1981 to 30% in 1988, and to almost 40% in 2001.
11 At a deeper level, however, both of these phenomena, we suggest, spring from the same
cause, which is the absence of adequate financial intermediation in China. The liquidity
trap made its appearance in the mid-1990s when Zhu Rongji decreed the removal of the
state bank manager if the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) in the bank were to go
up two years consecutively. As the majority of state enterprises are either in the red or
just  breaking even,  the  banks  became unwilling  to  lend money to  the  state-owned
enterprises. Lending more to private enterprises is not really a good option because,
one, their legal status is lower than that of state enterprises, and, two, there was no
reliable way to assess their balance sheets. The only activity that the banks are happy
to  allocate  their  funds  to  is  the  purchase  of  state  bonds,  i.e.  the  financing  of  the
government's  deficit.16 The elimination of  the  liquidity  trap requires  that  the  state
removes the barriers to lending to the private sector by ending legal discrimination
against them, and establishing uniform accounting and auditing standards that have
credible enforcement mechanisms.
12 In discussions on the rise of the savings rate, a common view is that the rise reflects the
uncertainty about the future that many SOE workers feel in the face of widespread
privatisation of loss-making SOEs. We find this explanation to be grossly incomplete
because there has also been a rise in the rural saving rate even though rural residents
have little to fear about the loss of jobs in the state-enterprise sector because none of
them are employed there. Based on the work of Liu and Woo17 on savings behaviour, we
conjecture that the desire to invest is an important reason for why the rural sector has
increased  its  savings  rate.  The  most  dynamic  industrial  expansion  in  China  in  the
1984-1994 period occurred in rural areas. Since non-state firms in rural areas could not
borrow from banks, the only way they could establish themselves was through self-
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financing, which required the would-be entrepreneurs to save first. In the very first
phase  of  rural  industrialisation,  the  amount  of  capital  needed  to  start  a  factory
workshop  was  very  low.  After  a  decade  of  rapid  industrial  growth,  the  Chinese
countryside is saturated with labour-intensive enterprises. As competition among rural
enterprises is very fierce at present, it no longer makes economic sense to invest and
open the same type of factory workshop. Rural enterprises must therefore move up to
the next  stage of  value-added production in order to  be more profitable.  This  new
generation of  rural  enterprises is  much more capital-intensive,  and thus requires a
much larger  amount  of  start-up  funds.  And  rural  residents  have  responded  to  the
higher capital requirements by increasing their saving rates. 
13 Since the phenomenon of investment-motivated saving must also be present within the
Chinese urban community the usual pessimism-based explanation for the rise in the
urban  savings  rate  is  only  partially  correct.  In  fact,  with  the  steady  relaxation  of
regulations  against  the  establishment  of  private  businesses  in  the  rural  and  urban
areas,  the  amount  of  investment-motivated savings  in  China  could  only  have  risen
more. To sceptics of our investment-motivated savings hypothesis, we want to point
out  that  Jeffrey Williamson18,  an economic historian,  has  summed up the historical
record of Western Europe and North America as showing that “investment demand
seems to have been the driving force behind private saving and accumulation, past and
present”19.
14 Table  2  reports  the  investment  trends  in  China  in  the  post-1978  era.  Total  fixed
investment has  increased  as  a  proportion  of  GDP:  an  annual  average  of  28.8%  in
1984-88, 34.0% in 1992-1996, and 36.3% in 1997-2001. SOE investment went up in the
period 1992-96 (19.8%) and then returned to the initial 1984-88 level (18.7%). We are of
the opinion, however, that the amount of state-directed investment in the 1997-2001
period could be more than three percentage points higher than 18.7% of GDP because
many of the big SOEs in 1988 had by 1999 converted themselves (or components of
themselves)  to  share-holding  companies  listed  on  the  stock  exchanges—while
remaining state-controlled. Furthermore, many SOES have formed joint-venture firms
with domestic and foreign companies, with themselves as the controlling shareholders.
 
Table 3. Rising fragility of China’s banking sector
NB: Proportion of non-performing loans for the four major banks for 1996 and 1998 are re-estimated,
based on new information made available at the beginning of 2001. The proportion for 2001 excludes
the renminbi 1.4 trillion transferred to the Asset Management Companies in the previous year.
Source: Citigroup, 2002, estimates.
15 Contrary to the rise in total investment and the likely rise in state-directed investment,
rural investment has fallen from 8.2% in 1984-88, to 7.7% in 1992-96, and then to 7.5%
in  1997-2001.  Our  hypothesis  is  that  a  major  reason  for  the  decline  in  the  rural
investment ratio is that the traditional labour-intensive factory is no longer profitable,
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and rural entrepreneurs have been unable to borrow the money to undertake the more
capital-intensive investments required for the next generation of rural enterprises20.
The investment-GDP ratio went up at the national level because FDI rose while state
investments  (through  the  budget,  state-owned  enterprises,  and  state-controlled
enterprises) utilised the higher domestic savings fully.
16 We now turn to show that another outcome of inadequate financial intermediation is a
chronic current account surplus. To see this point, consider the following accounting
relationship:21
(current account surplus) = (government budget surplus) + (savings of SOES –
investments by SOEs) + (savings of the non-state sector – investments of the non-state
sector)
17  The  facts  for  the  recent  period  are  that  the  current  account  surplus  (or,  loosely
speaking, the trade surplus) is positive, the government budget surplus is negative at
an unprecedented level, and SOE savings are lower than SOE investments. This means
that the savings of the non-state sector must greatly exceed the investments of the
non-state sector. As documented earlier, the government has sought to fight deflation
by increasing public works (i.e. running record budget deficits) and encouraging SOE
investments to soak up the excess savings. The rise in total investments has not been
sufficient to use up the excess savings, however, and these residual excess savings have
leaked  abroad  in  the  form  of  an  aggregate  trade  surplus.  Inadequate  financial
intermediation has made China a capital exporting country!
18 This perverse current account outcome is not new. Taiwan had exactly this problem up
to  the  mid-1980s  when  all  Taiwanese  banks  were  state-owned  and  were  operated
according to civil service regulations, which required the loan officer to repay any bad
loans that he had approved. The result was a massive failure in financial intermediation
that caused Taiwan's current account surplus to be 21% of GDP in 1986. 
19 China's  proclivity  to  generate persistent  current  account surpluses  has  managed to
manifest itself only after 1994 because of major policy changes implemented in that
year.  Before  1994,  with  the  government  budget  deficit  being  usually  small,  the
voracious absorption of bank loans by SOEs, in the soft-budget environment, to invest
recklessly kept the current account usually negative. In 1994, Zhu Rongji implemented
stricter controls on the state-owned banks (SOB) to reduce the then 24% inflation rate
and  the  explosion  of  NPLs.  This  lower  growth  rate  in  SOE  investments  from  1995
onward  is  the  reason  why  China's  built-in  propensity  towards  a  current  account
surplus  came  to  light  only  after  1995.  The  pronounced  tendency  towards  higher
current account surpluses is mainly caused by the rise in the savings of the non-state
sector for the reasons we identified earlier, e.g. rise in the required amount of start-up
capital,  improvement in the official attitude to market capitalism.22 The reason why
China is not producing the gargantuan current account surpluses seen in Taiwan in the
mid-1980s is because of its record budget deficit and the still excessive amount of SOE
investments. 
20 Obviously,  increasing budget  deficits  and SOE investments  to  counter deflation and
reduce the trade surplus can only be a satisfactory solution in the short term. In the
long term, the increased public investments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking
path that is wasteful, as in Japan (e.g building a second big bridge to a low-populated
island to benefit a politically-connected construction company), and the increased SOE
investments could convert themselves into NPLs in the SOBs. The right solution to the
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problem of excess savings is not for the government to absorb them by increasing its
budget  deficit  but  to  establish  an  improved  mechanism  for  co-ordinating  private
savings and private investments. This solution is correct regardless of the veracity of
our hypothesis about investment-motivated savings. We will argue later in the paper
that  the  formation  of  domestic  private  banks  and  the  entry  of  foreign  banks  will
correct  the  problem  of  inadequate  financial  intermediation,  and  eradicate  the
deflationary tendencies created by the liquidity trap and the paradox of thrift. The fact
is that the present banking system is a sinkhole, a situation that we will examine now.
The critical situation of China's banking system
21 In 1997-98, the government injected new capital into China's banks and transferred a
large  proportion  of  the  NPLs  to  the  state-owned  asset  management  corporations
(AMCs). These actions raised the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the four largest SOBs
from 4.4% at the end of 1996 to over 8% at the end of 1998, see Table 3. However, the
rapid appearance of new NPLs after 1998 lowered the average capital adequacy ratio of
the four largest SOBs to 5.0% by the beginning of 2002.23 The banking reform efforts of
the past several  years have failed,  and the state banks are now in need of  another
round of recapitalisation.24
22 In this situation of a fragile banking system, China has committed itself to opening up
the  banking  system  completely  within  five  years  of  joining  the  World  Trade
Organisation  (WTO),  which  it  did  in  December  2001.  Foreign  banks  could  conduct
transactions in foreign currencies from the beginning of WTO membership, conduct
transactions with the local corporate sector in renminbi after two years, and conduct
transactions with local households in local currencies after five years. Although foreign
banks are likely to compete only in the coastal cities, at least in the initial period, the
pressure on domestic banks can be high, as the big four banks extract about 95% of
their  profits  from  about  half  a  dozen  coastal  cities  (Shanghai,  Peking,  Xiamen,
Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Tianjin). Because there is no depositor insurance in China,
the obvious question is whether depositors will believe that these foreign banks will
drive the SOBs into open bankruptcy, and hence rush to withdraw their savings from
the SOBs, setting in motion the vicious downward spiral of credit contraction leading to
business  failures,  rendering  sound  financial  institutions  insolvent,  and  contracting
credit further.
23 Our reading is that even if pressures on the state banks do occur through depositor
withdrawals, there is unlikely to be a full-blown crisis because the central bank will be
able to issue currency to the state banks to meet the withdrawals. This expansion of
high-power money cannot be easily translated into a loss of foreign reserves because
capital  controls,  which we support,  remain in place and are likely to do so for the
foreseeable future. The resulting expansion of high-power money will also not have
much impact on inflation because this is mainly a shift out of bank deposits into cash,
or  from  some  banks  to  others,  and  not  a  shift  into  goods.  In  fact,  in  the  present
deflationary atmosphere, a run from bank deposits to goods is a macroeconomically
stabilising  development!  Simply  put,  the  government  has  the  technical  ability  to
accommodate  shifts  in  bank deposit  preferences,  even a  modest  bank run,  without
risking exchange rate collapse or runaway inflation.
24 One could therefore argue, as Fan has25, that if the Chinese government decides to keep
the SOBs as the dominant financial intermediation mechanism, then the SOBs should
not be re-capitalised again. The effective way to slow down the pace of NPL creation in
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an SOB-dominated financial system and keep the fiscal situation sustainable is to keep
the NPLs on the books of the SOBs, with "the financial status of these loans... constantly
watched and openly discussed" in the public media. We think, however, that Fan Gang's
solution  can  be  a  medium-term  solution  at  best.  In  our  assessment,  China's  WTO
accession has made recapitalisation of the SOBs inevitable in the coming decade. This is
because the large amount  of  NPLs  in  the  SOBs means that  they have much higher
operating costs than the foreign banks. SOBs have to pay interest on the deposits that
are the counterparts of the bad loans, whereas all the loans of the foreign banks (at
least in the beginning) will be serviced. With the foreign banks being able to afford to
pay higher deposit rates and to charge lower lending rates, the demise of the SOBs
seems inevitable unless their NPL burden is removed.26
25 In order for Fan Gang's suggestion of no recapitalisation to work at all, it is necessary
that the foreign banks (which will no longer face more restrictions than Chinese banks
by 2007), will not expand aggressively out of the big coastal cities to blanket the rest of
the country  with branches  in  a  short  period of  time.  Our  guess  is  that  Fan Gang's
method can work for about seven to ten years because we think that only HSBC and
Citibank  are  likely  to  actively  expand  their  banking  network  in  China  in  the  next
decade, and even then mostly in the major coastal provinces.
26 The most important priority for financial sector reform is the appearance and growth
of  competitive  domestic  private  banks.  As  China  is  required  by  its  WTO  accession
agreement to allow foreign banks to compete against its SOBs on an equal basis by 2007,
it would be akin to self-loathing not to allow the formation of truly private banks of
domestic  origin.  There  is  no  reason to  favour  foreign private  banks  over  domestic
private banks, and no reason why China should not allow its best financial minds to
compete  with,  and achieve  the  same glorious  success  of,  the  best  foreign financial
minds. We therefore recommend that, right after the recapitalisation of the big four
state banks, at least two of them be broken into several regional banks, and that the
majority of  these regional banks be privatised.27 At the same time,  the laws on the
establishment  of  new  banks  should  be  loosened,  and  interest  rates  deregulated.
However, it is most crucial that liberalisation of the financial sector proceeds no faster
than the development of the financial regulatory ability of the state. Even then, the
danger  of  substituting  financial  crash  for  financial  repression  is  still  a  real  one.  A
modern  financial  system  requires  a  modern  system  of  financial  supervision  and
prudential regulation for its proper functioning.
27 It would be a good idea to sell a few of the regional state banks to foreign banks. This
will facilitate the transfer of modern banking technology to Chinese banks. The more
local staff the foreign bankers train, the larger the pool of future managers for Chinese-
owned  banks.  An  accelerated  process  of  promoting  the  growth  of  sound  domestic
private financial institutions and allowing the entry of foreign financial institutions
would certainly shorten the time it would take for Shanghai it to assume its rightful
place  among  the  major  international  financial  centres,  and  to  contribute  to  more
efficient intermediation of the world's savings. 
28 We should mention that entry of Western banks into China’s financial markets is not
the same thing as liberalisation of the capital account in the balance of payments. We
do  not  believe  that  China  would  be  well  served  by  a  rapid  opening  of  the  capital
account, since that could subject China to rapid swings of short-term capital in the
same manner that has whipsawed the economies of South-East Asia and Latin America.
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Just as in financial market liberalisation, capital account opening should also proceed
gradually  and in stages,  because it  must  be  accompanied by sophisticated financial
market regulation, something that is clearly not in place at this time. The fact is that
foreign banks could suddenly become conduits for large-scale capital flight, or for rapid
swings in short-term lending and repayments, or facilitators of bank runs (in which
depositors do not merely switch banks, but actually switch to a foreign currency or
foreign assets).
The precarious fiscal position of the state
29 Since the government recapitalised the banks in 1998, and needs to do again now, the
important question is how many more rounds of bank recapitalisation can China afford
without generating a fiscal crisis? The simple fact is that fiscal sustainability lies at the
heart of whether a banking crisis would actually occur. As long as the state is perceived
to be able and willing to bail out the SOBs, depositors would retain their confidence in
the SOBs regardless of the actual state of their balance sheets. 
30 The stock of publicly-acknowledged government debt comes to only 16% of GDP, and so
it is usual to hear official assurances that the current fiscal deficits of less than 3% of
GDP do not pose a problem for debt servicing by the state. However, the analytically
correct measure of public debt is the consolidated debt of the state sector, which would
include at least some part of the contingent liabilities (e.g., foreign debts of SOEs and
SOBs, and unfunded pension schemes in the SOE sector) that the state might have to
assume  responsibility  for  when  the  state-owned  units  default  on  their  financial
obligations. We should note that if an analyst counts NPLs as contingent liabilities, then
they are really computing what the public debt will be after one more round of bank
recapitalisation,  i.e.  the  second  bank  recapitalisation.  According  to  Fan28,  the
consolidated public debt at the end of 2001 was 72% of GDP; and according to Citibank29,
it could be as high as 115%. So is China's present debt-GDP ratio too low or too high? 
31 To answer this question, we note that the central government debt-GDP ratios in Italy,
Sweden and the United States were, respectively, 117.6%, 70.8% and 50.5% in 199530. So
if China does undertake its second bank recapitalisation since 1997, its public debt will
still be within the range seen in advanced OECD countries that are not experiencing
fiscal crises. However, there are two important points to be made to show that this
finding is not an optimistic one.
32 First, the forthcoming recapitalisation of China's banks appears to be the last major one
that the government could implement in the short-term without risking the stability of
the domestic financial markets and its credit standing in the international financial
markets. A third recapitalisation will push the debt-GDP ratio to over 150%, well above
the OECD norm.
33 Second, if China recapitalises the SOBs a second time, then it will have to compromise
the expansionary fiscal policy that has been keeping GDP growth above 7% since 1997.
This is because China raises much less state revenue, as a share of GDP, than the OECD
countries, and hence has a much lower capacity to service its public debt. The revenue-
GDP ratio was 16.2% for China in 2001, 30% for Italy in 1995, 38% for Sweden in 1995,
and 21% for the United States in 1996.31 The additional debt service from the second
bank  recapitalisation  will  be  about  1.5%  to  2.5%  of  GDP.32 If  China  increases  tax
collection or reduces infrastructure spending to cover this increased debt service, then
this second recapitalisation of the SOBs will reduce the fiscal stimulus that has been
keeping  the  GDP  growth  rate  above  7%.  Between  these  two  options,  expenditure
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reduction cannot be considered the less likely outcome because China's experience in
the reform era is that frequent changes to the tax system have not been able to raise
revenue significantly for a sustained period. The reason for the low revenue-GDP ratio
could be because increasing tax collection is as much a political challenge as it is an
administrative challenge.33
34 In  summary,  China's  consolidated  debt-GDP  ratio  will  be  relatively  high  by
international  standards  after  a  second bank recapitalization,  while  its  revenue-GDP
ratio will remain relatively low. The greatest threat to the stability of China's financial
market  is  fiscal  sustainability,  and  the  biggest  threat  to  fiscal  sustainability  is
successive  rounds  of  bank  recapitalisation.  This  precarious  outcome  is  a  systemic
feature of the current banking system, a relic from the era where central planning was
the preferred engine of economic growth. Of course, we cannot attribute the creation
of NPLs entirely to the SOBs, their chief customers, the SOEs, deserve an equal share of
the blame.  The fact  is  that  without  solving the SOE problem,  the  problem of  NPLs
cannot be solved.
The failure of the latest reform in the state enterprise sector
35 We  must  emphasise  that  the  inflationary  problem  generated  by  the  traditionally
biggest macroeconomic destabiliser—the SOE sector—still exists. If anything, the SOE
sector  in  2003  has  not  only  become a  source  of  potentially  bigger  macroeconomic
instability, it has also emerged as a source of socio-political instability. To see the origin
of these negative developments, we review the Fan and Woo (1996) argument34 that the
reform  strategy  for  the  SOE  sector  during  the  1978-93  period  was  inherently
inflationary35. 
36 The crux of the 1978-93 SOE reform strategy was to transfer decision-making power
from  the  industrial  bureaux  to  the  state  enterprises.  The  increased  operational
autonomy of  the SOEs reduced the ability of  the industrial  bureaux to monitor the
financial situation within the SOEs, and hence created the incentive for SOEs to greatly
increase their demand for investment funds. The reduction in bureaucratic oversight of
the SOEs in a soft budget environment allowed the SOEs to use creative accounting to
privatise profits from good investment projects, and to receive state subsidies to cover
losses from bad investment projects. Until about 1996, the SOEs were generally able to
satisfy  their  large  appetite  for  investment  because  the  local  governments,  in  the
interest of local development, inevitably lobbied the local branches of the state banks
to grant  the SOEs'  applications for  investment loans.  The evidence overwhelmingly
shows  that  the  local  bank  branches,  at least  until  1995,  were  unable  to  resist  the
demand for easy money.36
37 The losses at SOEs exploded after 1992, when mother Russia officially went capitalist,
because many Chinese SOE managers saw the same fate for China in the future, and
concluded that this was their last chance to steal. As a result SOE losses skyrocketed
even though GDP grew in the range of 10% to 14% annually in the 1992-95 period. By
1995,  it  was  common  to  summarise  the  SOE  situation  as  one-third  of  them  losing
money, and another one-third making no money. From the vantage point of 2003, it
seems that continued inefficiency, and de facto asset-stripping and embezzlement of
firm profits by managers and workers are the primary causes for the general decline in
SOE profits,  with  the  latter  being  the  more  important.  The  devolution  of  financial
decision-making power to the SOEs and the steady reduction in discrimination against
the private sector have made it increasingly easy for the managers to transfer state
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assets  to  themselves.  It  is  hence,  perhaps,  only  natural  that  of  the  327  cases  of
embezzlement, bribery and misuse of public funds that were tried in Peking in 1999,
“76% took place in SOEs”.37 
38 The increasing public outrage over the inequity of the informal privatisation of the SOE
sector is well captured in the book by He Qinglian who wrote that the SOE reform has
amounted  to:  “a  process  in  which  power-holders  and  their  hangers-on  plundered
public wealth. The primary target of their plunder was state property that had been
accumulated  from  forty  years  of  the  people’s  sweat,  and  their  primary  means  of
plunder was political power.”38
39 The Chinese leadership had, by 1994, recognised the increasingly serious economic and
political  problems  created  by  the  principal-agent  problem  innate  in  the
decentralisation reforms of Lange-inspired market socialism, and it announced that the
clarification of property rights of SOEs would be added into its SOE reform programme.
The  Communist  Party  of  China  (CPC)  publicly  committed  itself  in  July  1997  to
converting most of the SOEs to publicly traded shareholding corporations—a form of
industrial organisation that originated in capitalist economies. The 1994-97 decisions to
address  the  loss-making  SOE problem  more  decisively  are  why  employment  in
manufacturing fell from 98 million in 1995 to 81 million in 2001.
40 The state's decision in 1997 to accelerate diversification of the ownership structure of
the SOEs has to be recognised to be a bold move because the experiences with mass
privatisation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) show that the task
is  an extremely  difficult  one and that  the  outcomes have consistently  fallen below
initial  expectations.  For  example,  in  Russia,  the  “loans-for-shares”  privatisation
transferred the country's enormous mineral wealth to a group of oligarchs, and the
weak  administrative  and  legal  structures  allowed  many  managers  to  take  effective
control of the privatised firms and loot them instead of improving their operations.
Furthermore,  the EEFSU experiences warn that mass privatisation is  an exceedingly
dangerous business politically, no matter how it is done, be it outsider privatisation or
insider privatisation. This is because the mass privatisation of SOEs generates so much
rent  that  massive  corruption  has  not  been  avoided,  and  the  resulting  corruption
inevitably delegitimises the government, e.g. Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic and
Boris Yeltsin in Russia.
41 Despite the mediocre to poor privatisation outcomes in EEFSU, privatisation has been
going forward in China, albeit with occasional stops, for two main reasons. The first
reason  comes  from  John  Nellis  who  points  out  that  “governments  that  botch
privatization are equally likely to botch the management of state-owned firms”39. The
answer is  not  to  avoid privatisations but  to  implement more careful  privatisations:
governments in transition economies should “push ahead, more slowly, with case-by-
case  and  tender  privatisations,  in  co-operation  with  the  international  assistance
community, in hopes of producing some success stories that will lead by example.”
42 The  second  reason  lies  in  that  the  delay  of  privatisation  can  be  costly  to  China's
government  politically.  Stealing  by  managers  does  occur  during  privatisation  and
creates a social backlash against the government, but the maintenance of the status
quo has become increasingly difficult because SOE managers in China know from the
EEFSU experience that they are in an endgame situation. The widespread spontaneous
privatisation by SOE managers could create grave social instability.
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43 Our opinion is that the solution to the SOE problem in China is not privatisation per se,
but a transparent, legal privatisation process that society at large can accept, at the
minimum, as tolerably equitable. Because an adequate privatisation programme must
compensate the retired and laid-off workers, permit takeover by core investors, and
respect  the  rights  of  minority  shareholders,  it  is  important  that  legal  reforms  be
carried out simultaneously.  Only with a transparent,  equitable privatisation process
that is overseen by an adequate legal framework, would China be likely to avoid a state-
created Russian-style kleptoklatura that would fuel social dissatisfaction.
44 Recently, there has been some questioning as to whether the case for privatisation has
been overstated.40 When Zhu Rongji was appointed premier in 1997, he announced that
he would solve the SOE problem in three years. In 2000, he declared victory on the SOE
front when the profits of the industrial SOEs leaped from 53 billion yuan in 1998 to 241
billion  in  2000.  In  a  careful  study,  Zhou  and  Wang  quantified  the  sources  of  the
financial turnaround, and found that41:
45 the lower interest rate in 2000 increased profits by 52 billion yuan (28% of the increase
in SOE profits);
46 the higher oil prices boosted overall SOE profits by 79 billion yuan because almost all
oil companies are state-owned (42% of the increase);42 and
47 the conversion of the bank loans of SOEs into equities held by state asset management
companies raised profits by 10 billion yuan (5% of the increase). 
48 About 75% of the increase in the profits of industrial SOEs in the 1998-2000 period was
not due to actions taken within these enterprises but to external factors. When Zhou
and  Wang  calculated  the  profit  rate  after  deducting  the  profits  from  the  more
favourable external environment, they found that it had increased from 0.7% in 1998 to
1.2% in 2000 for the SOE sector, and from 2.8% to 4.8% for the non-SOE sector. Despite
the recent good news on SOE profitability, the fact remains that the SOE sector still lags
considerably behind the non-SOE sector in efficiency. 
49 To sum up,  while  the recent  rise  in  profits  surely  gives  some breathing space,  the
capacity of SOEs to “dissipate rents” through high payments to managers and workers,
if not illegal transfer of assets, should remain clearly in the policy-makers' minds. Thus,
any gains could well be squandered, if not reversed, in a relatively short period of time.
It  is  hence  important  for  China  to  replace  the  present  uncontrolled  (and
uncontrollable)  process  of  asset-stripping  in  the  SOE  sector  with  transparent  and
equitable  privatisation  in  order  to  improve  macroeconomic  stability  and  to  defuse
socio-political instability. 
50 We  draw  four  key  conclusions  from  our  discussion.  First,  China's  dysfunctional
financial system has imparted a deflationary bias to the economy and made China a
capital exporting country by constraining the growth of aggregate demand to be less
than  the  growth  of  aggregate  supply.  The  government  has  been  actively  trying  to
neutralise deflation through an aggressive fiscal policy. We recommend that it should
now  reshuffle  and  slightly  expand  its  investment  programme  to  incorporate  large
import-intensive infrastructure projects so that the current account surplus could be
reduced as well. The additional infrastructure construction would create jobs, relieve
production bottlenecks, and, on top of that, preserve employment in China's export-
oriented sectors. However, the most efficient solution is for private investment rather
than public investment to recycle the pool of private savings back into the economy.
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The key to eradicating the deflation bias and the tendency towards current account
surplus lies in establishing an efficient financial intermediation mechanism. 
51 Second, frequent bank recapitalisation is the biggest threat to China’s fiscal solvency.
The forthcoming second recapitalisation of SOBs since 1997 is the last one that China
can afford.  Because  fiscal  solvency  requires  that  the  state  keeps  interest  rates  low
through regulation in order to contain the cost of debt service, China faces a difficult
trade-off between the maintenance of fiscal stimulus to keep growth on track and the
promotion of financial market development via bank recapitalisation and interest rate
deregulation. 
52 Third, the latest attempt to reform the SOEs has failed. This dismal outcome has been
masked by the large profits of the state oil companies resulting from the high price of
oil in the recent period. The losses of the non-oil SOEs from continued inefficiency and
increased embezzlement constitute a serious threat to sustained high growth, banking
sector solvency, price stability, and social stability.
53 Fourth,  while  it  is  important  to  manipulate  aggregate  demand  via  monetary-fiscal
policies to keep the actual growth rate close to the natural growth rate, China is in the
fortunate position that it can implement other economic policies that will increase the
natural growth rate. To use a production analogy, the biggest gain comes not only from
keeping an engine running at peak efficiency but also from having the engine with the
largest capacity. In short, the most important economic task for China is to adopt the
best economic growth engine that world economic history has identified: a market
economy where competitive private enterprises constitute the norm, and where the
state focuses mainly on the provision of public goods and social insurance. The switch
to  the  new  growth  engine  necessitates  that  China  continues  the  privatisation  of
nondefence-related  state  enterprises  that  are  not  natural  monopolies,  begins  the
privatisation  of  SOBs,  and  reduces  drastically  the  legal  discrimination  against  the
private sector.
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